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Abstract
Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other
such disturbance. It is argued here that this change blindness can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This
argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study
of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and to cast new light on the way that
it is — and is not — involved in visual perception. To illustrate the power of this approach, this paper surveys its use in exploring
three different aspects of vision. The first concerns the general nature of seeing. To explain why change blindness can be easily
induced in experiments but apparently not in everyday life, it is proposed that perception involves a 6irtual representation, where
object representations do not accumulate, but are formed as needed. An architecture containing both attentional and nonatten-
tional streams is proposed as a way to implement this scheme. The second aspect concerns the ability of observers to detect change
even when they have no visual experience of it. This sensing is found to take on at least two forms: detection without visual
experience (but still with conscious awareness), and detection without any awareness at all. It is proposed that these are both due
to the operation of a nonattentional visual stream. The final aspect considered is the nature of visual attention itself — the
mechanisms involved when scrutinizing items. Experiments using controlled stimuli show the existence of various limits on visual
search for change. It is shown that these limits provide a powerful means to map out the attentional mechanisms involved. © 2000
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Eye movement; Image flicker; Change blindness; Attention; Scene perception; Visual memory
www.elsevier.com:locate:visres
1. Introduction
Once upon a time it was widely believed that human
observers built up a complete representation of every-
thing in their visual field. More precisely, it was believed
that the stable and richly-detailed world viewed by a
normal observer gave rise to a stable and richly-detailed
representation within, a ‘picture’ that could be used for
all subsequent visual and visuomotor operations (e.g.
Feldman, 1985; Trehub, 1991). This representation was
thought to be long-lasting and spatiotopic, its contents
built up by the superposition of eye fixations, and the
results held in a high-capacity buffer. With such a visual
system, presumably, the observer could live happily ever
after.
This idea of a stable, general-purpose internal picture
accords nicely with subjective experience. It does not,
however, accord quite so nicely with objective fact. For
example, evidence is accumulating that visual processing
is split into two largely independent streams — one
concerned with the perception and recognition of objects,
the other with visuomotor action (e.g. Milner & Goodale,
1995). And recent studies indicate that perception itself
is susceptible to various forms of induced blindness:
repetition blindness (Kanwisher, 1987), inattentional
blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998), change blindness
(Rensink, O’Regan & Clark, 1997), and an attentional
blink (Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992). Taken to-
gether, these results show that the failure to experience
highly-visible stimuli is not a rare, pathological condition.
Rather, it is a much more widespread effect — so
widespread that it strongly suggests that observers never
form a complete representation of the world around them.
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Throwing out the notion of a stable internal picture1
has important consequences for vision research, both at
the theoretical and the methodological level. To begin
with, current research is concerned largely with opera-
tions on retinotopic representations, operations that
take place within a single fixation of the eye. A com-
mon (and often implicit) assumption in vision science is
that such operations are of primary interest, with their
integration over eye movements being an uninteresting
topic safely left for later study. However, if an all-en-
compassing picture is never formed, it becomes impor-
tant to determine the extent to which representations do
capture and hold on to properties of the world. It also
becomes important to determine how their formation is
co-ordinated with the task at hand, and to establish the
particular ways in which they are used (Appendix A).
Such issues must become a primary concern of vision
science, requiring an approach complementary to the
traditional one focused on within-fixation processing
(see Churchland, Ramachandran & Sejnowski, 1994;
Findlay, 1998).
But if vision is to be studied this way, what kinds of
theoretical constructs should be adopted? What kinds
of experimental approaches should be used? The pur-
pose of this paper is to show that there already exist
theoretical and experimental tools that can help with
this task. To this end, reviews will be presented of
several recent advances based on change blindness, the
finding that observers often fail to detect large changes
in a display if these are made at the moment that
transients appear (e.g. Rensink et al., 1997; Rensink,
O’Regan & Clark, 2000). It will be shown that the
theoretical and empirical tools originally used to ex-
plore this effect, and which helped demolish the idea of
a stable internal picture, can also be harnessed to more
constructive ends. In particular, it will first be shown
that these tools can provide a means of exploring the
general nature of seeing (i.e. the way that humans use
light to pick up information about their surroundings).
It will then be shown that these tools can also cast light
on the more specialized faculties of sensing (i.e. the
pickup of information not accompanied by visual expe-
rience) and scrutinizing (i.e. the pickup of information
via focused attention).
2. Change blindness
…the ordinary person at once responded to the meaning
and grouping of familiar scenes…I then sometimes sub-
stituted for the original figure a new one, changed in
some respect. Here again, it would be worth experiment-
ing in more detail to disco6er what types of change are
most readily reacted to.
Bartlett (1932)
Change blindness can be defined as the failure of
observers to detect large, sudden changes in a display
(Rensink et al., 1997). Although such changes are read-
ily seen under normal conditions, change blindness is
easily induced if the changes are made simultaneously
with an eye movement, film cut, image flash, or other
transient that masks the motion signals normally ac-
companying the change. (For a review, see Simons &
Levin, 1997.)
When discussing change perception, it is important to
keep in mind that a clear distinction should be made
between motion and change. As used here, motion
refers to the instantaneous alteration of a quantity.
Although it most commonly refers to shifts in location,
it can be generalized to other quantities, such as color
(see e.g. Adelson & Bergen, 1991). Motion can be
specified — under a fairly broad set of conditions2 —
in terms of derivatives, which describe such things as
speed and acceleration (see e.g. Nakayama, 1985;
Hildreth & Koch, 1987).
In contrast, change refers to the situation where a
quantity has a particular state at a time t0, and a
different state at time t0Dt (where Dt is some finite
increment of time). Change may or may not be accom-
panied by continuous motion. In many real-world situ-
ations, the alteration of a quantity occurs continuously,
and so can be picked up by low-level motion detectors.
However, change can also take place over a temporal
discontinuity, such as when a blank field intervenes
between an original and an altered display. In cases
where motion is picked up by low-level motion detec-
tors, both motion and change perception may take
place concurrently. In order to better isolate the various
mechanisms involved, change will be operationally
defined here as an alteration that cannot be picked up
1 In this paper, the term ‘stability’ is used in two ways. In its spatial
aspect, it denotes invariance over position of each particular eye
fixation; in its temporal aspect, it denotes invariance over the time of
each particular fixation, i.e. a representation that is not volatile. Both
these properties are required for a buffer that collects information
into a representation that is independent of eye position. Meanwhile,
‘complete’ refers to a representation that is not only stable, but
describes the entire visual field at a resolution equal to that of foveal
vision. Given that ‘picture’ refers here to a high-resolution representa-
tion, a stable picture is also a complete representation.
2 In general, simple continuity is not enough: additional conditions
are generally required to ensure that the derivatives of that particular
order and type can exist (see, e.g. Gelfand & Fomin, 1963). However,
the initial stages of visual processing generally involve only simple
first- and second-order derivatives. These are generally taken after
smoothing by low-pass filters, and so can be defined for most
conditions encountered in viewing the natural world (see, e.g. Marr,
1982; Hildreth & Koch, 1987).
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Fig. 1. Experimental paradigms for studying change detection. (a) One-shot paradigm. Observer views single alternation of displays, and is asked
to determine if a change has occurred. Measure of performance is accuracy of response. (b) Flicker paradigm. Observer views continual alternation
of displays, and is asked to determine if a change has occurred. Measure of performance is time required for response. Note that these two
approaches can also be applied to changes made contingent upon other types of transients, such as eye movements or blinks.
by low-level motion detectors3. As such, it is best
explored using alterations taking place outside the tem-
poral window of the motion detectors, a window of
about 50 ms (e.g. Woodhouse & Barlow, 1982).
2.1. Empirical de6elopments
The study of how visual representations endure over
time has its origins in early work on memory recall
(Bartlett, 1932). Here, observers were asked to deter-
mine a difference between a test figure and a similar
figure memorized on some previous occasion. As it
turned out, observers could remember the meaning and
approximate shape of the figure, but not the visual
details. Later studies showed a similar schematic mem-
ory for drawings and photographs of real-world scenes
(Mandler & Parker, 1976; Intraub, 1997).
This approach, however, was not powerful enough to
determine the nature of the perceptual representations
involved, for performance could always be explained by
limitations of long-term memory. The remedy for this
was to switch from the study of difference to the study
of change. Whereas difference involves two instances of
a stimulus, change involves only one — a single entity
that is perceived to have spatiotemporal continuity.
Thus, although memory is still involved, it is a memory
tightly bound to perceptual processing4.
The methodology for studying change stems largely
from the work of Phillips (1974)5. The basic design is
shown in Fig. 1a. Here, an initial display is briefly
shown (typically for a few hundred ms), followed by an
interstimulus interval (ISI), followed by a second dis-
play. The observer must determine if a change occurred
in the sequence. These limited-display (or one-shot)
studies showed that when ISIs were less than 80 ms or
so, observers were quite good at detecting a change,
presumably because it generated motion transients
marking its location. At greater ISIs, these transients
were no longer effective, and change blindness ap-
peared, with performance corresponding to a memory
for only three to five items in any display. Subsequent
work extended these results to a wider range of stimuli
and conditions (e.g. Avons & Phillips, 1980; Pashler,
1988), forming the foundations for the study of visual
short-term memory (vSTM).
Other studies showed that change blindness does not
depend on keeping the eyes fixed — it can also appear
if changes are made during a saccade (Bridgeman,
Hendry & Stark, 1975; McConkie & Zola, 1979). To
account for this, consider the sequence projected upon
the retina: first the original display (first fixation), fol-
lowed by a noninformative blank (or smear created by
the saccade), followed by a subsequent display (second
fixation). Except for the eye movements, this sequence
5 An earlier use of this procedure appears in Hochberg (1968).
Going back further in time, change blindness was also encountered
and exploited by movie editors, who early on found that movie cuts
could be rendered largely unnoticed if made during an induced eye
movement or blink (Dymtryk, 1984). In addition, conjurers have long
been aware of the involvement of attention in detecting change, and
have devised numerous strategies to misdirect it, resulting in ‘magical’
appearances and disappearances of objects (see e.g. Sharpe, 1988).
3 Loosely speaking, the difference is (at least in the domain of
spatial displacement) that between perceived true motion and appar-
ent motion.
4 The concept of ‘primary memory’ (James, 1890) is related to this,
in that it involves a requirement of temporal continuity.
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is the same as that used in the one-shot studies. Indeed,
the number of items that can be remembered across a
saccade is about three to five, the same as the capacity
of vSTM (Irwin, 1991, 1996).
A possible objection is that these limitations apply only
to the relatively simple characters and line segments used
in those experiments. However, the degree of change
blindness is not lessened by use of more realistic stimuli
— if anything, it increases (Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson
& Troscianko, 1995; Grimes, 1996; Simons, 1996). For
example, when a prominent building in a city skyline was
enlarged by 25% during a saccade, none of the observers
noticed the change (Grimes, 1996).
Another possible objection is that the one-shot tech-
niques do not give observers sufficient time to form
representations durable enough to support the percep-
tion of change. Saccade-contingent techniques make
changes after several seconds of viewing, and so escape
this objection. But the change blindness encountered in
those experiments could potentially be due to some
specialized mechanism having to do with saccades, and
thus may not accurately reflect what is happening in the
rest of the visual system.
To investigate this, a flicker paradigm was developed
in which the original and the modified images continually
alternated until the observer saw the change (Rensink,
O’Regan & Clark, 1995; Rensink et al., 1997).6 This
allowed images to remain clearly visible during most of
the presentation, the only distraction being a flicker
caused by their continual cycling (Fig. 1b). In contrast
to earlier approaches, this paradigm gave observers
sufficient time to develop a representation typical of
normal viewing. Furthermore, if eye movements caused
disruption, they could be minimized or even eliminated
by the observer. But in spite of these advantages, change
blindness was still found: large changes in pictures of
real-world scenes could often go unnoticed for up to 50
s, even though the change was made repeatedly, the
observer knew a change would be made, and the change
was easily seen once noticed.
Other studies show that change blindness can be
induced in a variety of ways, such as when changes are
made during blinks (O’Regan, Deubel, Clark & Rensink,
2000), movie cuts (Levin & Simons, 1997), or brief
‘splats’ that do not cover the change itself (Rensink et
al., 2000). The fact that change blindness can be induced
in a large number of ways — together with the strength
and robustness of the basic effect — indicates that it is
not an experimental artifact, but rather reflects some-
thing central about the way we perceive the world.
2.2. Coherence theory
Given that change blindness touches on something
central to vision, what might this be? One suggestion
(Scott-Brown, Baker & Orbach, 2000) is that it might
be a limitation in the way that multiple items can be
compared. In other words, considerable detail may be
accumulated in visual memory, but because of
constraints on the comparison process it is simply
difficult to make comparisons between the contents of
this memory and the contents of the current input.
Such a proposal, however, runs into problems. First,
it needs to explain why the detailed contents of
successive fixations cannot be added together (Irwin,
1991). It likewise needs to explain why visual search for
a changing item is difficult (Rensink, 2000b) — if the
details of successive displays could be combined in
some way, it would be a simple matter to look for the
distinctive pattern formed by the combination of the
original and modified items. Finally, this proposal also
needs to grapple with the fact that the comparison of
items that are already attended requires only about 20
ms:item, suggesting that relatively little of the difficulty
in detecting change is due a bottleneck in this aspect of
processing (Rensink, 1999a).
A more likely explanation for these results may
therefore be that there simply is no visual buffer that
accumulates an internal picture of the scene (see Irwin,
1991). Without such a buffer, the detailed contents of
successive presentations — including successive
fixations — can never be added, compared, or
otherwise combined on a large scale.7 Any change in a
scene would then be difficult to notice.
But if we are so bad at combining information on a
large scale, why don’t we notice this? Why do we
believe we can always see (i.e. visually experience)
change? Part of the answer is the hypothesis that
focused attention is necessary to see change (Rensink et
al., 1997). Under normal circumstances, a change in the
world is accompanied by a motion signal in the input,
which attracts attention to its location (see, e.g. Klein,
Kingstone & Pontefract, 1992) and so is easily seen. But
if this signal appears at the same time as other tran-
7 It is possible that there may be a spatiotopic buffer in which any
representation derived from the new input simply replaces the old.
(This is essentially the view taken in the following sections, except
with a spatiotopic rather than a retinotopic array.) But a spatiotopic
array leads to severe problems. To begin with, factors such as retinal
inhomogeneity make it difficult to integrate the contents of successive
fixations (Yeshurun & Schwartz, 1989). Furthermore, the computa-
tional requirements for representing the contents of the visual field
with a detail equal to that of foveal vision are overwhelming (Rojer
& Schwartz, 1990); as such, it is unlikely that such a scheme is used
in human vision. In any event, the main issue at this point in the
discussion is not completeness, but the difficulty of combining infor-
mation from successive displays.
6 The ‘one-shot’ and ‘flicker’ techniques are complementary ap-
proaches, relying on speed and accuracy measures, respectively. Such
complementarity is often used in psychophysical techniques, since
each approach has weaknesses that can largely be compensated for by
the strengths of the other.
R.A. Rensink : Vision Research 40 (2000) 1469–1487 1473
sients (associated with a saccade, flicker, eyeblink, splat,
etc.), it is no longer unique, and so cannot draw
attention. Change blindness is then induced.
This explanation, however, creates a problem. Atten-
tion is thought to ‘weld’ visual features into long-lasting
representations of objects (Kahneman, Treisman &
Gibbs, 1992), and to operate at a rate of about 30
items:s (Julesz, 1984; Wolfe, 1994). Why then doesn’t it
weld all the visible items within the first few seconds of
viewing and thereby enable the easy detection of
change?
The answer to this goes to the very heart of what it
means to be attended. Rather than assuming that the
structures formed by attention last indefinitely, their
lifetimes may be much more limited. In particular, it
may be that attention endows a structure with a
coherence8 that lasts only as long as attention is di-
rected towards it. A more precise specification of this
coherence theory of attention (Rensink et al., 1997;
Rensink, 2000a) is as follows (Fig. 2):
1. Prior to focused attention is a stage of early pro-
cessing, i.e. processing that is low-level (involving
only the geometric and photometric properties),
rapid (occurring within a few hundred ms), and
carried out in parallel across the visual field. The
resultant structures (proto-objects) provide local de-
scriptions of scene structure, such as three-dimen-
sional orientation, or groupings of related edge
fragments (Rensink & Enns, 1995; also see Wolfe,
1995 for a somewhat similar idea.) Proto-objects can
be quite complex, but are coherent only over a small
region of space (Rensink & Enns, 1998). They like-
wise have limited temporal coherence — they are
volatile, being constantly regenerated, and so are
simply replaced by any new stimuli appearing in
their retinal location. (Note that such replacement
rules out their superposition.)9
2. Focused attention acts as a hand that grasps a small
number of proto-objects from this constantly-regen-
erating flux. While held, they form a coherence field
representing an individuated object with a high de-
gree of coherence over time and space.10 This field is
formed via feedback between the proto-objects and
a mid-level nexus, a locus where lower-level infor-
mation is collected and used as the basis of higher-
level decisions. This coherence allows the object to
retain an identity across brief temporal interrup-
tions; as such, it is transformed rather than replaced
by new stimuli arriving at its location.
3. After focused attention is released, the object loses
its coherence and dissolves back into its constituent
set of proto-objects. Such a position is consistent
with results indicating a lack of attentional afteref-
fect in visual search (see also Wolfe, 1999). Note
that in this view, there is little — if any — short-
term visual memory apart from what is being at-
tended. This suggests that attentional hold may be
largely identified with vSTM.
According to coherence theory, a change in a stimulus
can be seen only if it is attended at the time the change
occurs. Since only a small number of items can be given
focused attention at any time (see e.g. Pashler, 1988;
Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988), most of the image will not
have a coherent representation. Thus, if attention is not
Fig. 2. Schematic of coherence field (Rensink, 2000a). In the absence
of focused attention, low-level structures (proto-objects) are volatile.
Attention acts by establishing feedback links between proto-objects
and a mid-level nexus. The set of interacting proto-objects, links, and
nexus is a coherence field. The interaction among the various parts of
the field allows the establishment of coherence in attended proto-ob-
ject properties, both in space and in time.
8 In this paper, ‘coherence’ refers to the conjunction of consistency
and logical interconnection, i.e. agreement that the structures refer to
parts of the same system. Like ‘stability’, this term is used in two
ways. In its spatial aspect, it denotes a set of representations at
different locations that refer to the same object; these representations
are essentially grouped together, with any interpretation assigned to
one representation influencing the others. In its temporal aspect it
likewise denotes a set of representations at different times that refer
to the same object (see Rensink, 2000a). Note that spatial stability
does not imply spatial coherence: the statistics of local features in a
scene, for example, could be largely invariant over eye movements,
even though never given a coherent representation. Conversely, spa-
tial coherence does not imply spatial stability: a coherent retinotopic
representation could be rebuilt with each eye movement.
9 It is possible for the fusion of two successive stimuli to occur
preattentively, presumably due to summation of their signals by filters
operating at the initial stages of visual processing. However, such
fusion requires that the onsets of the two presentations be within 100
ms of each other (e.g. DiLollo, 1980), a condition that does not
generally occur here.
10 This is somewhat similar to the idea of object files (Kahneman et
al., 1992). However, the emphasis here is on coherence in time as well
as space. Furthermore, coherence theory states that the representa-
tion of the object (i.e. the coherence field) is in existence only as long
as attention is being directed to the corresponding items in the display
— there is little or no memory of object structure once attention has
been withdrawn. This contrasts sharply with object files, which can be
accumulated over time.
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drawn to the location of a change, the change will likely
not be seen.
Coherence theory also explains results from several
related lines of research. For example, the volatility of
the proto-objects is sufficient to account for finding that
— apart from the limited amount held in transsaccadic
memory — the details of successive fixations cannot be
combined (see Irwin, 1996). Furthermore, if transsac-
cadic memory is identified with vSTM (Irwin, 1991)
and vSTM with the attentional grasp, it explains why
only a few saccade-contingent changes are perceived at
any one time. And given the close connection between
attention and saccade programming, it explains why
detection of change is best for objects that are saccade
targets (Irwin, 1996).
The failure to notice saccade-contingent displace-
ments in attended targets (e.g. Bridgeman et al., 1975)
might appear to argue against coherence theory. How-
ever, these experiments generally ensure that no back-
ground markings are visible. If the perceptual system
never codes position in absolute terms — relying in-
stead on relative locations — this lack of background
information would then cause a failure to perceive
change in location. Note that a change in the relative
location of a set of attended items is easy to perceive,
provided the number of items is small (Lachter &
Hayhoe, 1995).
It is also worth pointing out that coherence theory
helps elucidate the nature of mid-level processing11 —
in particular, the processing required to form a coher-
ent object representation. Previous models (e.g. the
‘object files’ of Kahneman et al., 1992) tended to echo
the earlier belief that vision accumulated detailed infor-
mation over time — once attention formed an object
file, it continued to exist for a time, even if unattended
(Kahneman et al., 1992). In contrast, coherence theory
posits that coherent representations (i.e. coherence
fields) collapse as soon as attention is withdrawn. And
whereas earlier models such as object files embodied the
view that attention is sufficient to see change, coherence
theory makes the explicit claim that it is necessary. (For
a more detailed comparison of these theories, see
Rensink, 2000a.)
2.3. Inattentional blindness
Coherence theory asserts that without attention,
there is no visual experience of change. But what about
the perception of static stimuli? Several studies (e.g.
Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Becklen & Cervone, 1983;
Mack & Rock, 1998) have found that observers attend-
ing to a particular object or event often fail to report
the appearance of irrelevant, unexpected items. This
has been interpreted as inattentional blindness, a failure
to represent unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Is
this the same thing as change blindness? If not, what is
the relation between the two phenomena?
To begin with, it is important to keep in mind that
the phenomenon of change blindness shows only that
we are blind to changes made in the scene — it says
nothing about whether we are also blind to the scene
itself. Coherence theory goes a step further, arguing
that unattended representations are not coherent
enough to support the perception of change. But it
takes no position on whether any visual experience can
be supported by unattended representations.
Conversely, the phenomenon of inattentional blind-
ness concerns itself with perception of the scene itself
— it says nothing about the perception of change. It
might be, for example, that we could see attended items
but not be able to see them change. Thus, at a purely
descriptive level inattentional blindness and change
blindness are largely separate phenomena: one pertains
to the static aspects of the scene, the other to its
dynamic aspects.
A relationship does emerge, however, when the
mechanisms explaining the two phenomena are exam-
ined. Consider the status of unexpected, unattended
stimuli in an inattentional-blindness experiment. It has
been shown that these items provide a context that can
influence the perception of attended structures (Moore
& Egeth, 1997). This suggests that representations of
considerable detail and sophistication are present, even
though they are not reported. Similarly, coherence the-
ory posits that low-level representations with some
degree of detail — proto-objects — are continually
generated in the absence of focused attention (Section
2.2). As such, explanations for both phenomena rely on
an assumption that unattended stimuli can give rise to
fairly sophisticated representations at early levels.
But what is that role played by these early-level
representations? It has been suggested that unattended
stimuli are indeed seen, but that in the absence of
attention are simply not remembered ; consequently,
inattentional blindness should be renamed inattentional
amnesia (Wolfe, 1999). Support for this position comes
from studies of iconic memory, which indicate that
much more can be scanned in a briefly-presented dis-
play than can be directly reported (Sperling, 1960). A
related finding is that change blindness can be substan-
11 There is at the moment some non-uniformity in terminology.
Some authors (e.g. Ullman, 1996) use ‘high-level’ to refer to object
perception, leaving ‘mid-level’ to refer to the perception of relatively
unstructured surface properties. Other authors (e.g. Henderson &
Hollingworth, 1999) use ‘high-level’ to refer to the perception of
meaning (i.e. identifying an object or a scene as something), with
‘mid-level’ vision referring to the formation of coherent, structured
representations such as objects. This latter usage is the one followed
here. Fortunately, the underlying conceptual structure is much the
same in both cases — it is only a question of what label is assigned
to what.
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tially reduced if a verbal cue is presented that describes
(in one or two words) the item that is changing
(Rensink et al., 1997). These results suggest that there
may exist some kind of scanning process that acts faster
than the process involved in the perception of change.
But although unattended items appear to support such
scanning, and so are seen in some sense, it is not clear
that this scanning process involves conscious visual
experience.
In summary, then, change blindness and inatten-
tional blindness (or inattentional amnesia) pertain to
different aspects of the world: change blindness to its
dynamic aspects, and inattentional blindness to its
static ones. As such, they are different phenomena. The
issue of visual experience — whether we experience
unattended stimuli and then forget, or whether we
never experience them at all — remains unresolved.
But even though little can be said about the particular
issue of visual experience, much can be said about
many other issues concerning how we see.
3. Seeing
What does it mean, to see? The plain man ’s answer (and
Aristotle ’s too) would be, to know what is where by
looking.
Marr (1982)
Coherence theory can explain why change blindness
occurs under a wide variety of conditions. But more
importantly, the consequences of this theory spill over
into several other aspects of vision, where they force
reconsideration of many basic issues.
For example, consider the general question of how
we see12. Coherence theory posits that there is no visual
buffer containing a complete description of the visible
scene. Even worse, it posits that only a small number of
objects have a coherent representation at any one time.
If this is so, why does it seem that we simultaneously
experience all the objects in our surroundings? And if
we do not build up a detailed description of a scene,
how does our visual system know what is where by
looking?
3.1. Virtual representation
To reconcile the large number of objects we experi-
ence with the much smaller number that can simulta-
neously be given a coherent representation, an appeal
can be made to the idea of a 6irtual representation :
instead of simultaneously representing in detail all the
objects in our surroundings, represent only those ob-
jects — and only those particular properties of those
objects — needed for the task at hand (Rensink,
2000a). If attention can form a coherent representation
of an object whenever requested, the representation of a
scene will appear to higher levels as if it is ‘real’, i.e. as
if all objects simultaneously have a coherent
representation.
At its heart, the use of virtual representation is an
information-processing strategy that reduces complexity
in space by increasing complexity in time. The factors
critical to the success of such a strategy are:
1. only a few objects need to have a coherent represen-
tation at any instant.
2. detailed information about any object must be made
available whenever requested.
The first requirement is easily met for most (if not all)
visual tasks, since there is usually only one object in
play at any one time; tasks involving more than a few
objects can be handled by rapidly switching attention
between the objects (Ballard, 1991; Rensink, 2000a).
The second requirement is also met under most condi-
tions: given that there is sufficient information to guide
attentional shifts and eye movements to the location of
a requested object, detailed information can always be
obtained from the incoming light and entered into a
stable representation. A high-capacity memory visual
buffer is therefore not needed — the information can
be obtained from the world itself. As pointed out long
ago by Stroud (1955):
Since our illumination is typically continuous sunlight and
most of the scenery stays put, the physical object can
ser6e as its own short-term memory…
Virtual representation is a central element of com-
puter and network design (e.g. Tanenbaum, 1976). Al-
though this form of representation was long neglected
as a possibility for biological systems, Stroud’s insight
has recently received increased recognition, and virtual
representation is now proposed as a way to explain
several aspects of perception and cognition (Brooks,
1991; Dennett, 1991; O’Regan, 1992; Grimes, 1996).
Indeed, it is becoming apparent that the environment is
a critical part of many perceptual processes, capable of
acting not only as an external memory but also as an
external processor (see Clark, 1997).
But how might such a dynamic representation be
implemented in the human visual system? One possible
12 As used here, ‘seeing’ is defined in a purely behavioral way,
referring to the use of light to carry out various tasks (Appendix A).
This section is therefore primarily concerned with the problem of how
information is managed. There is some discussion of visual experi-
ence, viz., how observers get the impression that many objects are
represented simultaneously. However, given that attention appears to
be sufficient for visual experience (Merikle & Joordens, 1997; Braun
& Julesz, 1998), that discussion pertains mostly to the way that
attention can be managed so that it is effectively allocated to many
objects simultaneously.
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Fig. 3. Schematic of triadic architecture (Rensink, 2000a). In this architecture, visual processing is split into three largely independent systems: (i)
early vision — a high-capacity system concerned with the rapid formation of sophisticated (although volatile) proto-objects, (ii) attentional vision
— a low-capacity system concerned with the formation of coherent objects, and (iii) nonattentional vision — a low-capacity system concerned
with establishing a context to guide focused attention. Note that according to coherence theory, the attentional system is needed for the visual
experience of change; nonattentional systems provide no such experience. As such, the unattended structures at early levels do not support the
visual experience of change. However, their contribution to the visual experience of static stimuli is unknown.
solution (Rensink, 2000a) is a triadic architecture of the
type shown in Fig. 3. This architecture comprises three
largely independent systems. The first is a low-level
system that rapidly creates highly-detailed, volatile
structures. The second is a limited-capacity attentional
system that forms these structures into coherent object
representations. These two systems are already part of
coherence theory. What is now added is a limited-ca-
pacity nonattentional system that provides a setting to
guide attention. This setting system involves at least two
stable aspects of scene structure:
1. The abstract meaning (or gist) of the scene, e.g.
whether the scene is a harbor, city, picnic, barnyard,
etc. Gist appears to be extracted without attention
(Oliva & Schyns, 1997), possibly on the basis of the
statistics of low-level structures such as proto-ob-
jects (e.g. Swain & Ballard, 1991). Since gist is
largely invariant with eye position, it can provide a
stable context that would constrain the kinds of
objects expected, and perhaps indicate their impor-
tance for the task at hand (Friedman, 1979).
2. The spatial arrangement (or layout) of the objects in
the scene. This appears to be described via a stable
representation of the location of each item (Simons,
1996; Sanocki & Epstein, 1997); a few of the proper-
ties of each item could also be included. Some such
representation is vital if the (limited) information
obtained from individual eye fixations is to be inte-
grated into a structure capable of directing subse-
quent eye movements and attentional shifts
(Hochberg, 1968).
The central assumption here is that the information in
this system is sufficient to direct attention and the eyes
to whatever object is required, which then allows the
attentional stream to temporarily form a coherent rep-
resentation of the object of interest. If this attentional
management is adequate, knowledge of the detailed
structure and location of any object will then be readily
available whenever requested.
3.2. Dependence on task
Given a dynamic representation of the type sketched
above, it is clear that attention should be managed so
that the limited amount of information stabilized is
used as effectively as possible. Such management is
presumably done via the use of strategies that depend
on the nature of the task.
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Early studies on picture perception (Yarbus, 1967)
showed a clear influence of task type on eye movement
patterns; given the close association between eye move-
ments and attentional shifts (e.g. Henderson, 1996),
they also provide an indirect demonstration that task
type can influence the pattern of attentional shifts.
Change-blindness studies, however, can provide a more
direct means of determining how the allocation of
attention depends on the task at hand.
An example of this is the finding (Hayhoe, Bensinger
& Ballard, 1998) that detection of change depends on
the demands of the task at the moment the change is
made. Here, observers were asked to form a copy of a
pattern of blocks on a computer monitor; this was to be
done by using a mouse to drag blocks from a set of
resource blocks elsewhere. During the course of con-
struction, a block in the target pattern would some-
times change color when an eye movement was made
toward it. Results showed that the ability to detect this
change — measured by the length of time the block
was fixated — depended on the particular point in the
task sequence. When the change was made before the
start of a resource-block move (presumably to obtain
the color of the pattern block), detection of the change
was poor; when the change was made after the move
(when the pattern block was again fixated, presumably
to check its color), detection of change was much
better. As such, these results show that attending to the
item served only for the immediate needs of the task at
hand, and not for the construction of some general-pur-
pose representation.
Change-blindness experiments also provide evidence
that the nature of the task not only affects when the
item is attended, but also the particular set of properties
selected. An example of this is a study which looked at
search for change in an array of simple figures
(Rensink, 1999b). When observers searched for a
change in orientation, search speed was considerably
influenced by the shape of the items, being almost twice
as fast for simple lines as for compound figures made of
two or more lines. However, when the same figures
were used in a search for change in contrast polarity, no
significant effect of shape was found. Evidently, at least
some aspects of geometric information did not enter
into the representations formed when only nongeomet-
ric information needed to be stabilized.
Similar effects have also been found using more
naturalistic stimuli (Levin & Simons, 1997). Here, ob-
servers watched a film sequence in which the main
character — presumably the focus of attention —
changed during a movie cut. Almost all changes went
unnoticed. When observers were then asked to watch
for changes in a second presentation of the film, perfor-
mance improved considerably (although most changes
were still missed). This again suggests that the only
aspects of a stimulus put into coherent form are those
that serve the immediate functional needs of the ob-
server (Rensink, 2000a; Simons & Levin, 1998).13
3.3. Dependence on high-le6el knowledge
Another consequence of a dynamic representation is
that the high-level knowledge of an observer greatly
affects how attention is managed, which in turn affects
how they see. Knowledge can have at least two effects
in this regard:
1. a ‘chunking’ of data into a unitary structure that
can be attended and held in visual memory in much
the same way as a simpler structure (e.g. Chase &
Simon, 1973).
2. a more effective guidance of attention, via the
knowledge of which aspects are important as well as
anticipation of what might happen next (e.g. Neis-
ser, 1976; Becklen & Cervone, 1983).
Given that attention is needed to see change, the per-
ception of a change in a realistic situation can be a
powerful tool to map out both of these factors. This in
turn can help map out what an observer knows, and
thus how they see their world.
As an example of using change perception to investi-
gate general knowledge, Rensink et al. (1997) showed
that changes in real-world scenes were noticed most
quickly for central interests, i.e. objects or regions that
were most often mentioned in brief verbal descriptions
of the scene. Evidently, attention is sent to these before
being sent to less interesting (and presumably less im-
portant) parts of the scene. Although part of the reason
that the central interests are attended relatively quickly
might be the salience of their visual features (e.g. color
or contrast), experiments on line drawings show that
higher-level factors such as semantic consistency also
play a part (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000).
It has also been shown that knowledge can affect the
perceptual representations themselves. One study (Ar-
chambault, O’Donnell & Schyns, 1999) had observers
learn a set of objects either at a general level of
categorization (e.g. ‘a mug’), or at a specific level (e.g.
‘the mug owned by Bill’). Changes were then made to
these objects in images of real-world scenes. As before,
detection of change was poor when the changes were
made during an interruption. However, performance
was better when the objects being changed had been
learned at a specific level than at a general level,
13 Care must be taken in distinguishing between ‘object’ defined as
a structure in the external world (i.e. a concrete spatiotemporal
entity) and as a structure internal to the observer (i.e. a coherence
field). If ‘object’ is taken to be an external structure, then attention to
it will encode only some of its properties. As such, attention is
necessary but not sufficient to perceive change in an object. If ‘object’
is defined as the contents of the coherence field, however, then
attention is both necessary and sufficient to form the field, and thus,
to perceive change in it.
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indicating that the particular type of learning influenced
the perceptual representations of the stimulus that were
formed.
In another study, Simons and Levin (1998) had an
experimenter ask people on the street for directions. A
few seconds after conversation began, workers carrying
a large board passed between the (unwitting) subject
and the experimenter, permitting the experimenter to be
switched with another person. Observers were much
more likely to notice the change when the experimenter
was considered to be a member of their social class,
indicating a high-level influence on the representations
used during the interaction.
Change perception has also been used to explore the
effects of specialized expertise. Werner and Thies (2000)
examined the ability of observers to notice changes in
scenes of American football games. Comparing the
performance of experts against that of non-experts,
they found that experts were quicker to spot changes,
regardless of whether or not these changes affected the
meaning of the scene. This is consistent with the pro-
posal that experts code the scene in a way that allows
them to spot changes in meaning relatively quickly, and
that their familiarity with the domain also allows them
to attentionally scan meaningful scenes more efficiently.
4. Sensing
We begin not with a sensory stimulus... In other words,
the real beginning [of seeing ] is… not a sensation of
light.
Dewey (1896)
Often implicit in the definition of seeing is the re-
quirement that the ‘knowing by looking’ be accompa-
nied by a sensory experience — more precisely, by a
conscious visual experience. But it is not necessary that
all aspects of visual processing must lead to visual
experience. Indeed, a large body of experimental evi-
dence (e.g. Schacter, 1987; Milner & Goodale, 1995;
Weiskrantz, 1996; Merikle & Joordens, 1997) points
towards the existence of sensing, i.e. the processing of
visual information without accompaniment by visual
experience, or by any conscious awareness at all. (For
definition of terms, see Appendix A.)
Historically, investigation of sensing has proceeded
rather slowly (see e.g. Merikle & Reingold, 1992).
Much of this has been due to the problem of producing
stimuli that are not visually experienced but yet still
affect the observer in some way. This has most often
been accomplished by weakening stimuli (e.g. by brief
exposure or added noise) to the point where they are
below the threshold of conscious perception. However,
such stimuli have also proven to exert only a weak
effect on other visual systems, making empirical investi-
gation difficult.
In contrast, it is relatively easy to generate large
suprathreshold changes that are — until attended —
effectively invisible. Given the magnitude of the
changes that can be made, and the duration over which
change blindness can last, it would appear that there is
a high likelihood of engaging other (nonattentional)
systems. As such, change perception may have consid-
erable potential for the empirical study of those aspects
of visual processing not accompanied by visual
experience.
4.1. Visuomotor response
Evidence is accumulating (e.g. Goodale, 1993; Milner
& Goodale, 1995) that vision may be composed of two
largely independent systems: an on-line stream concerned
with immediate visuomotor action (e.g. movement of the
eyes, maintenance of balance), and an off-line stream
concerned with more time-demanding processes (e.g. the
conscious perception and recognition of objects in the
immediate surround). When the off-line stream is
damaged (e.g. by a lesion), an observer may not have a
conscious experience of part of their environment, e.g. an
object in some part of their visual field. However, if their
on-line stream still functions, they will still be able to
interact with it in various ways, such as grasping or
pointing to it. This phenomenon is known as blindsight
(Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders & Marshall, 1974;
Weiskrantz, 1996).14
A similar separation of visuomotor response and
conscious perception has been found in normal
observers, reflecting the predominance of the visuomotor
system under certain conditions (Goodale, 1993). Much
of the evidence for this has been based on
change-detection experiments. For example, if the
location of a rod is changed the moment the observer
attempts to grasp it, an adjustment to the trajectory of
the hand will take place several hundred milliseconds
before conscious report of the change (Castiello,
Paulignan & Jeannerod, 1991). Motor adjustment —
although taking about a hundred ms longer — also
precedes conscious report when the size of the rod is
changed (Castiello & Jeannerod, 1991). In both cases,
then, there existed a brief period of time during which
the visuomotor system responded to the change, even
though there was no conscious perception of it.
14 The term ‘blindsight’ also extends to those situations where a
particular aspect of conscious perception is affected, such as loss of
color vision (see e.g. Weiskrantz, 1996; Stoerig & Cowey, 1997).
However, consideration in this section is limited to the case where the
visuomotor system responds to stimuli that are not consciously
perceived. The case of responding to unseen perceptual quantities is
essentially a form of implicit perception, which is considered in the
next section.
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A similar dissociation of perception and oculomotor
response also exists: even when a displacement in loca-
tion made during a saccade is not consciously per-
ceived, the eye still makes a corrective saccade to the
new location (Bridgeman et al., 1975). Other studies
(Bridgeman, Lewis, Heit & Nagle, 1979; Goodale, Pelis-
son & Prablanc, 1986) found this to be true of manual
pointing as well — if a target was displaced during a
saccade, the hand of an observer reaching toward it
would correct its trajectory, even though the observer
never consciously noticed the displacement.
Likewise, Hayhoe et al. (1998) found that a saccade-
contingent change to the color of a block in a display
caused the eye to fixate on it longer than usual, even
though observers had little conscious experience of the
change. Interestingly, this effect increased in strength
when other, irrelevant blocks changed color at the same
time, indicating that some more global factor was also
at play. In any event, these findings indicate that vari-
ous visuomotor systems are able to support the detec-
tion of changes to the targets of their actions, even
though these may not be attended (or at least attended
in a way that enables the conscious perception of the
change).
4.2. Implicit perception
The studies described above show that the occurrence
of change can affect on-line action without being ac-
companied by any visual experience. But what about
the perceptual stream itself, where the processing of
information is presumably for off-line control?
An interesting phenomenon in this regard is implicit
perception. When a stimulus is masked almost immedi-
ately after being presented, it can cause priming (i.e. an
increased sensitivity to the subsequent occurrence of the
same stimulus), even though the observer has no sub-
jective experience of it (see e.g. Marcel, 1983). It has
been suggested that such implicit perception is exactly
perception without attention (Merikle & Joordens,
1997).
Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000) examined
whether change could be detected implicitly. They pre-
sented two brief displays, the first a simple array of
rectangles, the second a similar array in which one of
the rectangles changed its orientation. These displays
were followed by a test display highlighting two of the
display items — the changed item, and the item dia-
metrically opposite it in the display (Fig. 4). Observers
were asked to guess — regardless of whether they had
seen the change — which of the two highlighted test
items had changed. Results indicated that when observ-
ers did not visually experience the change, they were
able to correctly guess the correct test rectangle more
often than not. The level of performance was not high,
ranging from 55% when the display contained 16 items
to 63% when it contained eight. However, in all cases
performance was significantly above chance.
Importantly, control experiments showed that ob-
servers were faster to discriminate an item appearing at
the location of a change, but only when the observer
was aware of the change. The finding that explicit
perception is accompanied by (presumably attentional)
priming is consistent with the assertion of coherence
theory that attention is needed to visually experience
change (Section 2.1). Meanwhile, the finding that im-
plicit perception is not accompanied by such localized
priming is in accord with the proposal of Merikle and
Joordens (1997) that implicit perception never involves
attention. As such, this result supports the idea of a
clear separation of processing: the explicit perception of
change is mediated by focused attention, whereas the
implicit perception of change is not.
In another set of studies, Thornton and Fernandez-
Duque (1999) showed that non-localized priming could
be found for changes that were not explicitly perceived.
For example, when an item changed from horizontal to
vertical, a subsequent horizontal probe tended to be
perceived as vertical, but only if the observer had no
awareness that a change had taken place. Response
times also tended to slow down, but only if the observer
did have an awareness of the change. Interestingly, this
form of priming does not require the probe to be at the
location of the change, indicating that the system in-
volved is concerned with the general type of change.
Taken together, these results suggest that the implicit
perception of change involves a mechanism operating
independently of focused attention. Given that perfor-
Fig. 4. Perception of change without awareness (Fernandez-Duque &
Thornton, 2000). Here, observers view a one-shot display sequence,
with displays composed of arrays of rectangles. They are then shown
a test display containing a highlighted subset of the original display:
the item that changed, and the item diagonally across from it.
Observers are asked which of the two items changed. If they did not
notice a change in the one-shot sequence, they are asked to guess. For
cases where observers had no awareness of change, performance was
still significantly above chance, indicating some degree of implicit
perception.
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Fig. 5. Mindsight (Rensink, 1998a). Observers view a flicker display
sequence containing a change in a real-world scene. Observers are
asked to press a button twice: first when they feel a change occurring
(t1), and then when they consciously see it (t2). For many observers, t2
exceeds t1 by more than one second on roughly a quarter of all trials.
This phenomenon of ‘feeling of seeing’ with no accompanying visual
experience is termed mindsight.
there no significant difference between valid and invalid
t1 responses, indicating a strategy of pure guessing
unaffected by any sensing of change.
Evidently, then, a considerable fraction of observers
can have an abstract mental experience without sensory
experience. It is worth mentioning that this phe-
nomenon — mindsight (Rensink, 1998a) — may allow
the exploration of visually-mediated processes that are
difficult to study using more conventional techniques.
An interesting possibility in this regard is that mind-
sight may correspond to the ‘sixth sense’ sometimes
believed to provide a warning to an observer in a
dangerous situation.
The mechanisms underlying mindsight are not well
understood. Trials where t2 t1]1 s (the criterion for
mindsight) did not have smaller t1 values — i.e. feelings
were not faster than visual experience. Rather, t2 values
were larger, indicating that there was a delay in experi-
encing the change. This delay was limited to only about
25% of the trials, showing that mindsight is not due to
a general slowdown of attentional processing. Rather, it
appears to be due to a nonattentional mechanism15,
possibly an alert of some sort. The reason for the delay
in visual experience is unclear — perhaps the observer
has difficulty disengaging from the nonattentional
mechanism, thereby slowing down the processes under-
lying the visual experience of change. However, given
that only a small amount data has been gathered, such
an explanation is necessarily speculative. Future investi-
gations will hopefully cast more light on the mecha-
nisms underlying this phenomenon.
5. Scrutinizing
For many reasons, the question that once appeared fun-
damental and clear-cut, about the locus of attentional
selection, now looks confusingly ill-defined or (at best)
fragmented into a 6ariety of subquestions.
Allport (1992)
Just as change-blindness experiments can shed light
on sensing, so can they shed light on other, more
familiar aspects of visual perception. One aspect of
particular relevance in this regard is scrutinizing, i.e. the
application of focused visual attention. According to
coherence theory (Section 2.2), focused attention is
necessary for the perception of change. If this view is
correct, not only can focused attention be used to
mance is better when fewer items are in the display, this
mechanism is likely to have a limited capacity. A
possible candidate in this regard may be one of the
nonattentional streams posited for the triadic architec-
ture sketched above (Section 3.1). Since these are lim-
ited-capacity and nonvolatile, such a stream could
support the implicit detection of a limited number of
changes at any one time.
4.3. Mindsight
Can an observer consciously sense that a change is
occurring but still have no visual experience of it? In
one study (Rensink, 1998a), 40 observers were pre-
sented with a flicker sequence in which an image of a
real-world scene alternated with a similar image altered
in some way (Fig. 5). Observers pressed a button first
(t1) when they were aware that something was chang-
ing, and then again (t2) when they 6isually experienced
the change, i.e. when they believed they could describe
the item that was changing. Catch trials (where no
change occurred) made up 12.5% of the presentations,
allowing an estimate of what happened when observers
simply guessed that a change was occurring.
The results of this study were clear: even when a
conservative criterion was used (t2 t1]1 s), sensing
was found to occur in a large number of trials. Interest-
ingly, most of these were from a small subset (14:40) of
observers; half the observers (20:40) experienced little
or no sensing. In both groups, guessing occurred on
about 15% of the catch trials. However, invalid t1
responses occurred several seconds later than valid t1
responses, indicating that whenever an observer simply
guessed, there was a significant hesitation in their re-
sponse. Only in a small subset (6:40) of observers was
15 Such an explanation would be consistent with the finding of
Bonnel and Hafter (1998) that detection of luminance change does
not have a capacity limit, and so presumably does not require
attention.
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explain change blindness, but change blindness can be
used to investigate the nature of focused attention itself.
Much has been learned of attention using other
approaches, such as visual search on static displays, and
priming (see e.g. Pashler, 1998). However, the perception
of change involves a more dynamic aspect of visual
perception than these, and so is likely to be a largely
independent source of information. Furthermore, the
magnitude of change-blindness effects is usually quite
large. From a methodological point of view, then, change
blindness has the potential to yield experimental results
with a high signal-to-noise ratio. And this in turn may
allow us to explore the mechanisms of focused attention
in great detail.
5.1. General methodology
A powerful way to investigate the mechanisms of
focused attention is by using one-shot or flicker
paradigms (Section 2.1) with arrays of simple figures
(Phillips, 1974; Pashler, 1988; Rensink, 2000b). To see
how this works, consider an array of rectangles, where
one item (the target) changes its orientation on half the
trials while the other items (the distractors) do not; the
observer must then report for each trial whether or not
a change was present (Fig. 6). If roughly half the items
are horizontal and half vertical in both images, the
target cannot be detected from any single display —
both displays must be compared. If the interstimulus
interval (ISI) between displays is sufficiently long, the
transients due to the changing target will be swamped
by the transients produced by the flickering distractors.
Detecting the target will then require an attentional
scan of the items in the display.
This approach extends the ‘classical’ visual search
paradigm on static displays (e.g. Treisman & Gormi-
can, 1988) into the temporal realm. All the power of
the static techniques (e.g. using different shapes, differ-
ent features, search asymmetries) is retained; in addi-
tion, two more degrees of freedom can be manipulated:
display time (on-time) and ISI (off-time). Note that the
one-shot and flicker techniques are natural extensions
of the two different ways that have historically been
used to measure performance on static displays, viz.,
accuracy on briefly-presented displays (e.g. Sagi &
Julesz, 1985), and reaction time on displays that are
shown until the observer responds (e.g. Treisman &
Gormican, 1988).
Visual search for change allows various aspects of
attentional processing to be investigated. These include:
5.1.1. Speed
As in the case of static visual search, this can be
determined by examining how performance varies as a
function of the number of items in the display; for the
flicker variant, reaction time often increases linearly
with the number of items, indicating a constant search
speed (Rensink, 2000b). In contrast to static search, the
geometric properties of the target do not have to be
specified in advance — it can be defined simply as the
item that changes. Furthermore, the influence of
salience can often be eliminated by proper choice of
items in the display, such as when half the items have
one value of a property (e.g. vertical) and the other half
the other value (e.g. horizontal).
5.1.2. Capacity
This can be determined by measuring performance as
a function of on-time (i.e. the display time) — as
on-time increases, more items can be ‘grabbed’ by
attention, until saturation is reached (Pashler, 1988;
Rensink, 2000b). The value of this asymptote has been
interpreted as a measure of vSTM; however, given the
close identification of vSTM with attention posited by
coherence theory (Section 2.2), it can also be taken as a
measure of attentional capacity. Note that this estimate
is an upper bound on the number of attentional links
involved, since grouping factors may lead to chunking,
causing more than one stimulus item to be assigned to
each link.
5.1.3. Selecti6ity
This can be determined by comparing the speed
when all items must be examined against the speed
when the change occurs in a selected subset. For exam-
ple, the speed for orientation change can be measured
for a set of black and white items; it can then be
measured for the same items, but with the change
occurring only in the black ones. The ratio of these two
speeds is a measure of the selectivity for black
(Rensink, 1998b).
Fig. 6. Flicker paradigm with controlled displays. Displays are arrays
of rectangles. In half the displays, one item (the target) changes
orientation while the other items (the distractors) remain constant. In
the other half of the displays, all items remain constant. According to
coherence theory, the only way for an observer to determine if a
change is occurring is to carry out an attentional search of all items
in the display.
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5.1.4. Task
Different aspects of change perception can be explored
using different types of task, such as detection (reporting
if there is a change in the display), identification (report-
ing what the change is), and localization (reporting where
is it). Although it might be thought that these tasks
should lead to similar estimates of attentional ability,
such is not the case — for example, capacity estimates
for identification are always below those for detection
(Wilken, Mattingley, Korb, Webster & Conway, 1999).
Furthermore, the stimuli in the experiments can have
different levels of complexity. This allows experiments to
progress in a smooth way from simple tasks on highly-
controlled arrays to more natural tasks on images of
complex, real-world scenes.
5.2. Empirical results
Relatively few experiments have yet been carried out
on the perception of change under controlled conditions.
However, the results already obtained show some inter-
esting patterns. For example, flicker experiments indicate
that as long as memory limitations do not intrude, search
for the presence of change takes place at approximately
100 ms:item, the exact speed depending on the shape of
the items (Rensink, 1999b) and particular property being
changed (Rensink, 2000b). Meanwhile, search for the
absence of change (i.e. search for a constant target among
a set of changing distractors) takes place much more
slowly — typically, about 300–400 ms:item (Rensink,
1999a). And search for a conjunction of change (i.e.
search for a target changing both dimensions among a
set of distractors that each change in one) also takes place
much more slowly — again, about 300–400 ms:item
(Rensink, 1999a).
Interestingly, a similar pattern is obtained for esti-
mates of attentional capacity. Search for a presence of
change leads to estimates of about four to six items, i.e.
only about four to six items can be attended at a time
(Pashler, 1988; Rensink, 2000b). This number is similar
to the capacity of vSTM, and supports the conjecture
that vSTM is largely (if not entirely) identical to what can
be held by the attentional ‘hand’ (Rensink, 2000a).
However, search for an absence of change leads to a much
lower number — a value of only 1.4 items (Rensink,
1999a). And search for a conjunction of change leads to
an estimate of only 1.0 items (Rensink, 1999a). Note that
this pattern is not only the same as that for the speed
estimates — it also has a striking similarity to the pattern
found in static visual search, where presence of a distinct
feature can be detected quite quickly, while detecting an
absence or a conjunction of features is slower and more
effortful (Treisman & Gormican, 1988).
The limit of one also appeared in tests of attentional
selectivity (Rensink, 1998b). Here, it was found that
selection of items based on contrast polarity was essen-
tially perfect, as might be expected. However, selection
based on orientation (e.g. looking for polarity changes
among vertical items) was poor, corresponding to the
selection of just one item at a time.
5.3. Attentional mechanisms
Although the pattern of results described above is not
sufficient to provide an unequivocal specification of the
attentional mechanisms involved in change perception, it
is sufficient to provide several constraints on its opera-
tion. In what follows, discussion will often be couched
in terms of how these constraints affect the structure of
coherence fields (Section 2.2); however, it should be kept
in mind that many of these constraints can also be
applied to other models of attentional representation
(e.g. the object files of Kahneman et al., 1992).
The first of these constraints is aggregation, the con-
straint that the information from each attended item is
not kept separate, but is — at least to some degree —
pooled into an aggregate description at a mid-level nexus
(Fig. 7). This constraint follows from the finding that
capacity is much higher for presence of change than it
is for absence of change (Rensink, 1999a). In essence, it
posits that the cause of this asymmetry is the same as the
cause of the asymmetry for simple features (Treisman &
Gormican, 1988): the pooling of signals (across the
attended items for change; across the visual field for
features) causes detection of presence to be easier than
detection of absence. More concretely, imagine a situa-
tion where information is pooled into one nexus, and
where a sufficiently large change gives rise to a signal of
1 (Fig. 7). When looking for a changing item among
constant distractors, the signal is 1 for target present and
0 for target absent, leading to relatively easy search. In
contrast, when looking for a constant among changing
items, the difference is much less: assuming that informa-
tion can be collected from five links, the signal is 4 for
target present and 5 for target absent. A more effective
strategy in this case would then be to simply collect
information from one link — and thus one nexus — at
a time (Fig. 7).
Note that this constraint also explains why search is
so much slower for detecting the absence of change.
Given that only one to two items can be ‘grabbed’ at a
time, and that search speed is about 300–400 ms
(Rensink, 1999a), it follows that the formation of a
coherence field takes about 400–500 ms16. Search for the
presence of change can be done more quickly,
16 This value is close to the attentional dwell time, which is
sometimes thought to reflect the minimum amount of time that
attention can be given to an item (Ward, Duncan & Shapiro, 1996).
Whether this similarity a deeper connection between the two values is
an interesting question for future work.
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Fig. 7. Explanation for search asymmetry (Rensink, 1999a). (a) When searching for a changing target among constant distractors, there will be
1 change (target present) versus 0 changes (target absent). As such, there is a relatively strong signal differentiating target-present from
target-absent trials, even when information from several links is collected. (b) When searching for a constant target among changing distractors,
there will be n1 changes (target present) versus n changes (target absent). Given that n is about 5 or 6, only a weak signal differentiates
target-present from target-absent trials. To obtain a 1:0 signal ratio, the nexus must collect information from only one link at a time.
since more items can be incorporated into the field, thus
reducing the number of times it needs to be set up.
Another constraint is that the number of items that
can be independently attended at a time17 can be no
more than two, and possibly no more than one. This
follows from the capacity limit of 1.4 items on search
for absence of change, and the limit of 1.0 item on
search for conjunctions — there appears to be no real
sense in which two items can be independently checked
to see if they still have the same orientation as before.
In addition, a limit of 1 (i.e. a singularity constraint)
could help explain why only one item at a time can be
selected on the basis of orientation (Rensink, 1998b).
The difficulty of detecting conjunction changes gives
rise to a third constraint: little (if any) intrafield binding
occurs. If the orientation and polarity of each item
could have been bound separately within the coherence
field, capacity for conjunction changes would have been
five to six, just as for simple property changes. A
similar lack of intrafield binding may also explain the
results of Saiki (1999) and Scholl, Pylyshyn and Fran-
coneri (1999), who discovered a large amount of change
blindness existed for remappings of colors, even when
all the items involved were being tracked, and thus
presumably attended. However, more work needs to be
done before this matter can be completely resolved.
Note that the possibility that attended information is
collected into only one nexus — that in effect, only one
object is attended at a time—has the potential to
resolve one of the more vexing issues in the study of
attention: the binding problem. Although this problem
takes on many forms, at heart is the issue of how a set
of properties (shape, location, etc.) assigned to one
object can be prevented from being erroneously as-
signed to others (see e.g. Ashby, Prinzmetal, Ivry &
Maddox, 1996; Treisman, 1996). Although many solu-
tions have been proposed, none has won widespread
acceptance (see Strong & Whitehead, 1989). However,
if only one object is attended to at a time, there may
simply be no problem — whatever is in the coherence
field is assigned to that object. Different objects in the
world can be assigned different properties by having a
field first form for one object, then for the next object,
and so on for the others. If objects can be given
coherent representations when requested (Section 3.1) it
will appear as if multiple objects are present, each with
its own set of properties. Seen in this way, the binding
problem is similar to the problem of combining the
contents of successive fixations (see e.g. Bridgeman, van
der Heijden & Velichkovsky, 1994): it is considered
relevant only because of the way things appear to us as
observers. In reality, however, it does not need to be
solved. Rather, the problem to be addressed is one of
gating, i.e. how to select the various features that are to
enter into the coherence field at any moment in time.
6. Summary
The work surveyed here shows how change percep-
tion can be used as a tool to cast light on the operation
of our visual system, both in regards to the general
17 It is of course possible to attend to more than one item in the
image. However, if the set of attended items feeds into the same
nexus, it is not possible to treat them as completely separate objects.
For example, when threading a needle both the needle and the thread
must be attended. However, they are not independent objects, but
parts of a single needle-thread system. Note that attending to items in
this way is not necessarily counterproductive. In the case of the
needle and thread, the fact that their locations are sent to the nexus
allows accurate calculation of the relative distance between them,
thereby facilitating the threading of the needle.
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nature of seeing, and in regards to the operation of its
more specialized aspects, such as sensing and scrutiniz-
ing. It also shows how coherence theory — originally
developed to account for change blindness — can
provide a rough theoretical framework that can help
us understand several aspects of visual processing.
In regards to the issue of how we see, coherence
theory indicates that our visual perception is based on
a representation with qualities quite different from the
world it represents — in particular, it is not simulta-
neously detailed and stable. Consequently, a durable
representation such as an intrinsic image or primal
sketch (e.g. Marr, 1982) cannot be the basis for visual
perception. Instead of such a static structure, it ap-
pears that a dynamic 6irtual representation is used,
which provides only a limited amount of detailed,
coherent structure, but provides it whenever requested,
making it appear as if all the detailed, coherent struc-
ture is present simultaneously. In this view, then, vi-
sion is an inherently dynamic process, a ‘just in time’
system whose detailed representations are in constant
flux.
Empirical advances in the areas of sensing and scru-
tinizing have also begun to provide new insights into
particular aspects of visual perception. Change-detec-
tion studies show that observers have a limited ability
to detect a change in a scene even when they have no
conscious experience of it. They also show that some
observers can have a conscious experience of change
without an accompanying visual experience. This sug-
gests that nonattentional processing streams are able
to detect change to some extent, and to influence the
observer in ways not always open to conscious visual
experience. Highly controlled studies on change detec-
tion have also provided considerable insight into fo-
cused attention, both about the underlying
mechanisms and on the way attentional allocation de-
pends on task structure and observer knowledge. An
interesting possibility in this regard is that the binding
problem may be illusory — it may be that the proper-
ties of only one object at a time are ever bound
together.
Change perception will not provide insight into ev-
ery aspect of visual processing. But change-perception
experiments can range over a wide variety of stimuli
(simple arrays to complex natural scenes), physical
parameters (different durations of displays and inter-
ruptions), task demands (looking for various combina-
tions of changes and non-changes), and levels of
knowledge (naive observers to experts). They can
therefore cover many of the interesting questions in
vision, while remaining linked to each other. Conse-
quently, such experiments have the potential to show
how low-, mid-, and high-level processes are knit to-
gether, and how they allow us to interact with our
environment.
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Appendix A. Taxonomy and terminology of visual
operations
As long as vision was believed to be a unitary
faculty, it was possible to use just a few (largely inter-
changeable) terms to refer to its operation — for
example, ‘seeing’ and ‘perceiving’. However, recent re-
sults suggest that vision involves a set of quasi-inde-
pendent systems, with these being used in a number of
different ways. Much of this paper is devoted to delin-
eating the various systems involved. To help keep the
resultant description in mind, this appendix provides
an overview in the form of a brief taxonomy of visual
operations. This taxonomy (including the choice of
terms) is somewhat provisional. However, it has been
based as much as possible on existing characteriza-
tions, and so should inherit a degree of robustness.
A simple sketch of the taxonomy is shown in Fig.
A1. The first level is simply that of ‘vision’, i.e. the use
of light to carry out actions of the system, regardless
of what these actions are or how they are carried out.
The term ‘sight’ will be used interchangeably with this,
and ‘seeing’ will refer to the associated activity. Such
usage is a purely behavioral one — it allows us to say
things like ‘The fly saw the wall’ without concerning
ourselves about whether or not it had an accompany-
ing subjective experience. Note that the use of ‘sight’
in this nonrestrictive way allows consistent use of the
terms ‘blindsight’ and ‘mindsight’. It can also allow for
more restrictive use (e.g. when referring to subjective
experience) when the restrictions are clear from the
context.
The first division in the taxonomy is that proposed
by Milner and Goodale (1995): the partitioning of
operations into on-line processes that use light for the
immediate control of visuomotor actions (visual
praxis) and off-line processes that form representations
serving as the basis for more deliberate activities (vi-
sual perception). The next division is that of the per-
ceptual operations, which are split into implicit
processes (involving no conscious awareness of their
output), and explicit processes (for which there is at
least some awareness). Again, this division is a fairly
well-established one (see e.g. Merikle & Joordens,
1997).
Finally, explicit perception is separated into visual
awareness (in which there are no phenomenal impres-
sions, or qualia), and visual experience (in which there
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Fig. A1. Taxonomy of visual operations. Upper half shows relations of individual operations. Lower half shows groupings of these operations on
the basis of visuomotor involvement, conscious awareness, and visual experience.
are). Note that in both cases, there is an accompanying
conscious experience of some kind — the division
depends on whether or not the experience is a 6isual
one, i.e. whether qualia are an essential part of it). Also
note that the term ‘sensing’ refers to all aspects of
vision that do not involve visual experience, and so
includes visual awareness as well as implicit vision.
Defined this way, the border between sensing and
experiencing does not depend — at least in principle
— on the involvement of focused attention (or
scrutiny). Given that the relation between focused at-
tention and visual experience has yet to be established
(Section 3.3), it remains to be seen how attention fits
into this taxonomy. If focused attention is necessary
and sufficient for conscious visual experience, the cur-
rent divisions will suffice; otherwise, a refinement of
some kind will be needed.
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